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INTRODUCTION
The Roberts Court has made a lot of First Amendment law. Since
Chief Justice John Roberts took the Supreme Court’s helm in 2006,
the Court has issued decisions on the merits in about thirty-five free
speech cases. With greater vigor than the late Rehnquist Court, the
present Justices have waded into free speech controversies ranging
from violent video games1 to commercial speech2 to campaign fi-
nance regulation.3 In all those areas, the Court has handed import-
ant victories to First Amendment claimants. Free speech advocates’
conventional (not to say universal) view of this Court is adoring.
Renowned First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams has stated, “It
is unpopular speech, distasteful speech, that most requires First
Amendment protection, and on that score, no prior Supreme Court
has been as protective as this.”4 Burt Neuborne, a leading academic
and legendary civil liberties lawyer, concurs: “This court is the
strongest First Amendment court in history .... The current majority
uses the First Amendment as a powerful tool of deregulation that
eliminates virtually all government efforts to regulate anything to
do with the flow of information.”5 Former judge and current Baylor
University President Kenneth Starr has called the Roberts Court
“the most free speech Court in American history.”6
1. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (striking down a state ban
on the sale of violent video games to children).
2. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (striking down a state restriction
on pharmaceutical representatives’ use of certain prescriber identifying information in sales
talks with doctors).
3. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (striking down the federal ban
on corporate and union independent expenditures on behalf of candidates for federal office).
4. Adam Liptak, Study Challenges Supreme Court’s Image as Defender of Free Speech,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2012), at A25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. Greg Stohr, Speech Rights Triumph as U.S. High Court Limits Government Power
BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-28/speech-
rights-triumph-as-u-s-high-court-limits-government-power.html [http://perma.cc/LUN6-PV3Q]
(internal quotation marks omitted).
6. A.E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court at Seven, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF
76, 82 (2012) (quoting Kenneth W. Starr, Address at the Pepperdine Judicial Law Clerk
Institute (Mar. 18, 2011)), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/
Howard_OutofInfancy.pdf [http://perma.cc/6H6T-WCAB].
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Investigation of those bold claims must start in what, based on
recent history, might seem like an obscure judicial precinct: cases
about categories of speech that the First Amendment does not pro-
tect, like obscenity and fighting words. For nearly three decades the
Supreme Court said very little of note about such categorical speech
exclusions.7 The Roberts Court, however, has given this neglected
neighborhood a makeover. Some of this Court’s most important,
striking First Amendment decisions address proposals for new cate-
gorical exclusions or applications of familiar categorical doctrines.
The Justices have not just resolved categorical issues. Rather, they
have changed the law of categorical exclusions, announcing a new
guiding star for assessing categorical First Amendment claims:
tradition. According to the Roberts Court, a categorical exclusion
can only pass constitutional muster if it reflects a substantial
tradition of leaving speech open to regulation. In two prominent
decisions, this focus on tradition has led the Court to reject govern-
ment calls to make a new categorical exclusion for certain violent
images.8 Those decisions serve as exhibit A for commentators who
praise the Roberts Court as strongly speech protective.
The decisions that reject new categorical exclusions deserve some
of the acclaim they have received. Unfortunately, their speech-
protective results carry limited precedential weight. Worse, these
decisions actually undermine speech protection in other cases by
tying categorical exclusions to the Court’s account of what our law
has traditionally let governments regulate. That linkage has led the
Court to reinforce or fortify nonprotection for pandering nonexistent
child pornography, freely using copyrighted material, and making
legislative votes. The Court’s most recent categorical speech deci-
sion, United States v. Alvarez, potentially advances expressive free-
dom by refusing to categorically exclude lies from First Amendment
protection.9 The Justices, however, could not agree on a rationale in
that case, robbing it of precedential force.10 The categorical speech
cases, celebrated by the Roberts Court’s enthusiasts, provide only
limited, very mixed benefits for any robust model of free speech. For
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part II.
9. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012); see infra Part IV.
10. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537; infra note 217 and accompanying text.
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every stand the Roberts Court takes to protect speech, it hands
down another decision that restricts speech. These cases, taken
together, suggest this Court cares about protecting private speech
from blatant censorship, but only within carefully managed limits
that ensure speakers will not challenge social or political stability.
I. THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CATEGORICAL SPEECH EXCLUSIONS
The development of categorical speech exclusions stretches back
to the beginning of First Amendment law. Decided in the shadow of
World War I and the Russian Revolution, the Court’s earliest free
speech cases fixated on how speech could lead to violence.11 The
Justices repeatedly upheld convictions of communists and anar-
chists (the great paladins of 1920s First Amendment law) for urging
violent overthrow of the government.12 Fear that speech could spark
violence broadened during World War II, as reflected in the pivotal
case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.13 Chaplinsky involved a mem-
ber of Jehovah’s Witnesses (the great paladins of 1940s First
Amendment law) who reportedly called a police officer “a God
damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist,” on a public street.14 The
State convicted him of violating a local law that forbade “ad-
dress[ing] any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any other
person ... [or] call[ing] him by any offensive or derisive name.”15 In
affirming the conviction, Justice Frank Murphy famously explained:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or “fighting” words—those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
11. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding the Sedition Act of
1918); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (regarding enforcement of the Espionage
Act of 1917 during World War I).
12. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925); Abrams, 250 U.S. 616; Schenck, 249 U.S. 47.
13. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
14. Id. at 569.
15. Id.
2015] ROBERTS COURT AND FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH 1343
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.16
The justification in Chaplinsky for permitting states to ban “fighting
words” modeled the categorical approach to setting the First
Amendment’s boundaries.
The categorical approach has fostered important limitations on
First Amendment rights, some of which have stood the test of time.
We properly hail New York Times Co. v. Sullivan as one of the
Court’s great speech-protective decisions because it severely limited
government officials’ power to sue their critics for defamation.17 But
with an evolutionary leap in nuance, Sullivan also effectuated the
Chaplinsky dictum about “libelous” speech.18 Expression that de-
fames another person got only limited First Amendment protection,
even as Sullivan provided a safe harbor for criticisms of public
officials.19 Similarly, in a series of decisions culminating in Miller v.
California, the Court long ago decided that “obscene” speech—
another item from the Chaplinsky catalog—gets no First Amend-
ment protection.20 Miller defined the legal category of “obscenity”:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the
average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work [at issue], taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.21
16. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. Id. at 268.
19. Sullivan allowed public officials to recover for defamation only upon a showing of
“actual malice,” meaning that the defendant knew or acted in reckless disregard of the
defamatory statement’s falsity. See id. at 279-80. The Court extended this requirement, in
limited circumstances, to “public figures” as well. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 345 (1974) (discussing proper criteria for the public figure category).
20. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
21. Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Other post-Chaplinsky doctrines deny First Amendment protection
to fraudulent speech in a commercial setting22 and to speech that
conveys a “true threat.”23 These categorical doctrines still matter.
People rely on defamation law to protect their reputations and fraud
law to protect their pocketbooks. The Miller allowance for banning
obscenity still puts quite a few people behind bars.24 The true threat
doctrine, although somewhat obscure, is crucial when relevant.
As an active method for making law, though, the categorical
approach has been declining for almost a half century. The Court
has whittled the “advocacy of violence” category of unprotected
speech down to a much narrower category of speech that actively
and willfully incites someone to imminent violent action.25 The
Court has similarly reined in Chaplinsky itself, holding that denial
of First Amendment protection to “fighting words” does not remove
protection from emotionally charged, deeply offensive statements
hurled at an unsuspecting audience but not at a particular person.26
For decades the Supreme Court said very little in these categorical
fields, even in the areas in which categorical limits on First
Amendment protection still matter. Only once since the Court
handed down Miller in 1973 has it announced a new category of
unprotected speech—when the New York v. Ferber Court denied
First Amendment protection to child pornography in 1982.27 That
categorical doctrine, which we will encounter again shortly, comes
with an asterisk. The Ferber Court denied protection only to actual
22. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
23. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per curiam).
24. For example, between October 1, 2008 and September 30, 2009, the federal govern-
ment made over 1500 arrests for “obscene materials,” pursued 23 cases to disposition, and got
16 convictions. MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES (2011), available at http://perma.cc/
59K9-NK7B. Those prosecution and conviction numbers do not amount to much, but many
more obscenity prosecutions happen at the state and local levels. Also, the extremely high
arrest-to-conviction ratio suggests, at least at the federal level, the use of arrests to intimidate
and deter purveyors of disfavored materials.
25. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
26. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). For an effort to rehabilitate
Chaplinsky, see Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42
RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 294-300 (1990) (attempting to supplement and strengthen the
Chaplinsky basis for excluding fighting words from First Amendment protection).
27. 458 U.S. 747, 765-66 (1982).
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images of actual children engaged in sexual conduct.28 The First
Amendment still protects nonobscene simulated images or written
descriptions of children having sex.29 Unlike other categories of un-
protected speech, the Ferber child pornography doctrine directly tar-
gets not speech but conduct—sexual exploitation of children— that
the government obviously has power to regulate.30
This musty history matters for our purposes because over the
past few years, the Roberts Court has thought harder and done
more about categorical First Amendment exclusions than the Court
had during the preceding thirty-five years.31 The present Court has
forcefully declared that it will not expand categorical exclusions. At
the same time, and based on the same mode of analysis, the Court
has more quietly reaffirmed and even strengthened existing
categorical limits on the First Amendment’s protection.
II. THE SPEECH-PROTECTIVE ROBERTS COURT: REJECTING NEW
CATEGORICAL EXCLUSIONS
The Roberts Court has handed down two decisions that reject the
categorical approach as a basis for new restrictions on speech. The
categorical approach burst back to prominence in United States v.
Stevens.32 Stevens, a video dealer, challenged his criminal conviction
for violating a federal law that banned making, selling, or possess-
ing certain depictions of animal cruelty.33 Stevens himself sold vid-
eos of pit bulls fighting and attacking other animals, but Congress
had really passed the law in question to combat “crush videos.”34
This almost unbelievably odious genre, aimed at a particular sexual
fetish, depicts women in high heels torturing and killing small ani-
mals by crushing them.35 No one questions the government’s power
28. Id. at 765-66.
29. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (striking down ban on
virtual child pornography).
30. Id. at 249.
31. Ronald Collins, The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 9, 2013, 11:34 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/07/the-roberts-court-and-the-first-
amendment [http://perma.cc/3SNU-EVXY].
32. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2012).
34. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583.
35. See id.
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to criminalize actual animal torture. Yet the law at issue in Stevens
only punished images.36 The government lawyers in Stevens knew
they had a big problem because the law banned (probably unwit-
tingly) a wide range of images, potentially including videos and
magazines about hunting and certain religious practices.37 Treating
this problem as an opportunity, the government swung for the
fences, asking the Court to add “depictions of animal cruelty” to the
list of unprotected speech categories.38 The government argued that,
to reach that result, the Court simply needed to do what it had done
decades earlier in Chaplinsky: declare that as a category of speech,
depictions of animal cruelty do more harm than good.39
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for an eight-to-one majority, at-
tacked the government’s argument like one of Stevens’s pit bulls. He
called the government’s proposed cost-benefit test for unprotected
categories of speech “startling and dangerous.”40 Yes, he conceded,
the Court in Chaplinsky and other cases described categorical
exclusions in the language of cost-benefit analysis.41 Description,
however, differs from justification. The Chief Justice explained that
in every case of a categorical exclusion, narrowing the scope of First
Amendment protection has turned on tradition.42 Every category of
speech to which the Court has denied First Amendment protection
was simply a “historic and traditional categor[y] long familiar to the
bar” as lacking constitutional protection.43 The Chief Justice used
the Ferber child pornography decision as his main illustration. Child
pornography, according to Ferber, was “an integral part” of the
underlying, illegal abuse of children.44 The Court, the Chief Justice
asserted, had long treated speech integrally related to unlawful
conduct as a category of unprotected speech.45 Therefore, the
tradition analysis explained Ferber.46 In contrast, the Chief Justice
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 48.
37. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1588-90.
38. See id. at 1584-85.
39. Id. at 1585-86; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
40. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
41. See id. at 1586.
42. Id. at 1585.
43. Id. at 1584 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
44. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
45. Id. at 761-62.
46. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
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maintained, we have no tradition of punishing depictions of animal
cruelty.47 Any future addition to the list of categorical exclusions
from First Amendment protection would have to track a traditional
allowance for restricting the speech in question.48
With its categorical argument in shreds, the government in
Stevens could only lamely argue that the law used to convict Stevens
was narrowly drawn to bar certain “extreme” material. The stat-
utory language, however, belied that argument, and the Court
struck down the law as unconstitutionally overbroad.49 Chief Justice
Roberts emphasized that even “recreational” speech, like hunting
videos, gets First Amendment protection,50 and he mocked the
government’s backup assurance that the Court should trust the
executive branch to prosecute only extreme speech.51 The Chief
Justice suggested that a narrower law might survive First Amend-
ment review,52 but not this law. Only Justice Alito dissented from
the Court’s decision, striking what has become his occasional pose
as the Court’s defender of moral justifications for restricting deeply
offensive speech.53 He urged a narrow reading of the statute to save
it from fatal overbreadth.54
The Stevens Court’s tradition analysis stands out for its novelty
in an area of First Amendment law that had not seen any major
conceptual innovation for decades. Chief Justice Roberts insisted, as
the Court often does when it changes the law, that he was simply
describing what the Court has been doing all along.55 Does that
claim hold water? Most of the Court’s other major categorical
decisions—Chaplinsky, Brandenburg, Virginia Pharmacy, Ferber—
have said little or nothing about tradition, concentrating almost
entirely on substantive justifications for excluding certain speech
47. See id. at 1585.
48. Id. at 1587
49. See id. at 1592.
50. See id. at 1590.
51. See id. at 1591 (“[T]he First Amendment ... does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse
oblige.”).
52. See id. at 1592.
53. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito objected on similar grounds to the Court’s
reasoning in Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742-43 (2011) (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text; see also Snyder v.
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
54. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1593-94 (Alito, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 1584 (majority opinion).
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from First Amendment protection. Those decisions provide greater
support for the government’s “categorical balancing” argument in
Stevens than for the Court’s tradition-bound analysis. Sullivan and
Miller fit better into the Chief Justice’s tradition story because they
accommodate long-standing common law provisions for the state to
punish defamation and obscenity. Even those decisions, however,
focused primarily on substantive reasons for the speech restrictions
they endorsed. For instance, the Sullivan Court did not just declare
that the Anglo-American legal tradition allowed recovery for
defamation. Rather, the Court worked through why, and to what
extent, the First Amendment should limit that allowance.56
For the Roberts Court to announce, almost a century into the de-
velopment of First Amendment law, a new approach to the old
problem of categorical exclusions suggests one of two motives. The
Court may want to reduce the potency of the categorical approach
across the board. That approach, though, has not exactly been
gaining traction over the past few decades. The other possibility is
that the Court wants to enhance its flexibility for either disapprov-
ing or approving categorical exclusions.
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Court revisited
some of the themes from Stevens in a more controversial dispute
with broader social consequences.57 The video game industry chal-
lenged a California law that banned the sale or rental of “violent
video games” to children under the age of eighteen.58 The law
deliberately tracked the contours of Miller v. California59 and
Ginsberg v. New York, another Supreme Court decision that allowed
states to restrict children’s access to sexually oriented material that
the First Amendment protects for adults, such as simple nude
images.60 Mimicking those cases, the California law barred minors
from buying or renting any video game that a “reasonable person,
56. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-80 (1964) (conducting an extensive
substantive analysis to arrive at the actual malice standard).
57. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
58. Id. at 2732-33.
59. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
60. See 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968). The Ginsberg allowance for restricting minors’ access to
a broader range of sexual material, which Miller left unprotected, is commonly called the
“harmful to minors” or “obscene as to minors” doctrine. See Amy Adler, All Porn All the Time,
31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 695, 698 n.11, 706-07 (2007) (discussing the “harmful to
minors” doctrine).
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considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or
morbid interest of minors.”61 It relied on “prevailing standards in
the community as to what is suitable for minors.”62 Even more
pointedly than the federal law struck down in Stevens, the Califor-
nia law stood for the idea that the First Amendment should not
completely protect violent images under the Constitution while
allowing the government to restrict sexual images.63 As Justice
Breyer put the point in his dissent: “What kind of First Amendment
would permit the government to protect children by restricting sales
of [an] extremely violent video game only when [a] woman—bound,
gagged, tortured, and killed—is also topless?”64
Our kind of First Amendment, responded seven Justices,
although only five had their hearts in it. Justice Scalia wrote for an
ideologically diverse majority that included Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.65 He first reiterated the Stevens
Court’s premise, which California did not challenge, that the First
Amendment protects not just sober political messages but also
entertainment.66 Justice Scalia also emphasized that children have
First Amendment rights, important because the California law only
restricted speech for children.67 He set California’s law alongside
government crusades to “protect” children from “penny dreadfuls”
in the 1880s, movies in the early twentieth century, comic books in
the 1950s, and song lyrics more recently.68 All of those efforts, he
argued, improperly sought to deny children’s right of access to
information.69 Justice Thomas, typically Justice Scalia’s ally, con-
tributed an epic dissenting opinion—which no other Justice
joined—for the sole purpose of attacking the notion that children
have free speech rights.70 More than anyone else on the Court,
Justices Scalia and Thomas usually insist that the Court should
61. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2732 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A) (West
2009)).
62. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A)).
63. See id. at 2735.
64. Id. at 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 2732 (majority opinion).
66. See id. at 2733.
67. Id. at 2735-36 (“[M]inors are entitled to a significant measure of first amendment
protection.” (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975))).
68. See id. at 2735-37.
69. See id. at 2736.
70. See id. at 2752 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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interpret the Constitution based on history, specifically our best
understanding of what people thought a constitutional provision
meant at the time it came into effect.71 In Entertainment Merchants,
Justice Thomas used this “original public meaning” approach to
argue at length that when the Bill of Rights was enacted people
never would have thought the First Amendment protected children’s
free speech rights independent of their parents’ wishes.72
Justice Scalia, however, hardly abandoned history in Entertain-
ment Merchants. The heart of his opinion rejected California’s effort
to stretch categorical nonprotection for obscenity into categorical
nonprotection for violent images, based on the same rationale that
drove Stevens: tradition.73 Justice Scalia has long advocated a
leading role for tradition in shaping constitutional rights, including
First Amendment rights.74 In Entertainment Merchants, Justice
Scalia explained that the constitutional difference between sex and
violence is that our society has traditionally punished sexually
explicit images while giving violent images a pass.75 Bans on violent
content would have to be “part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized)
tradition of proscription” to justify the California legislature in
restricting violent images simply because they are violent.76 Justice
Scalia dipped into the well of tradition a second time to reject Cali-
fornia’s narrower argument that, even if the First Amendment
protects violent images for adults, it should not protect them for
children.77 Noting the body counts in Grimm’s Fairy Tales and high
school reading lists, Justice Scalia found no “longstanding tradition
71. This approach to constitutional interpretation has reached its peak in Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, which used historical analysis to conclude
that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms. 554 U.S.
570 (2008).
72. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2751 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 2733-36 (majority opinion).
74. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing based on tradition that a ban on nude dancing did not implicate the First
Amendment); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-27 (1989) (plurality opinion) (using
a tradition-based analysis to reject a biological father’s substantive due process claim for
parental rights).
75. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 2735.
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in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions
of violence.”78
Lacking a categorical exception to the First Amendment’s protec-
tions, California needed to satisfy strict First Amendment
scrutiny.79 Justice Scalia found the video game law “underinclusive”
as to the state’s interest in stopping the spread of violence. The law
restricted only video games, not other violent entertainment, and it
did not stop adult relatives from giving the games to children.80 He
also found the law “overinclusive” as to the state’s interest in
helping parents control children because it stopped children from
buying or renting violent games even when their parents permitted
them to do so.81 Those failures doomed the law under the First
Amendment.
Justice Scalia refused to let violent video games’ vivid, interactive
imagery justify their suppression. “[A]ll literature is interactive,” he
declared; indeed, the more interactive the better.82 To Justice Scalia,
censoring video games because of their immersive qualities amount-
ed to punishing a message for its content and effectiveness, exactly
the sort of attack on ideas the First Amendment is supposed to
prevent.83 That argument is where he lost Justice Alito (joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, the author of Stevens, despite Justice Scalia’s
claim that Stevens dictated his reasoning). Justice Alito agreed that
California’s law was unconstitutional, but not for the majority’s
reasons. Instead, his separate opinion found the law’s definition of
“violent video game” unconstitutionally vague, triggering a First
Amendment principle that vague terms doom a speech-restrictive
law because such vagueness can “chill” protected speech.84 Justice
Alito endorsed Justice Scalia’s tradition-based distinction between
sexual and violent images, asserting that our society’s long history
of suppressing obscenity “helped to shape certain generally accepted
norms concerning expression related to sex,” an experience that he
claimed did not extend to violent expression.85 Justice Alito strongly
78. Id. at 2736.
79. Id. at 2738.
80. See id. at 2739-40.
81. See id. at 2740-41.
82. Id. at 2738.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 2742-46 (Alito, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 2746.
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objected, however, to Justice Scalia’s sanguine attitude toward video
games’ immersive technology.86 Echoing the moral outrage of his
Stevens dissent, Justice Alito decried some games’ “astounding”
level of violence, which leave virtual victims “dismembered, decapi-
tated, disemboweled, set on fire, and chopped into little pieces ...
cry[ing] out in agony and beg[ging] for mercy.”87 He viewed the
technological sophistication of these violent images as, culturally
and legally, a game changer.88
Free speech advocates should rightly find much to like in Stevens
and Entertainment Merchants. Most obviously, the Court in these
cases rejected aggressive efforts by the federal government and the
largest state government to expand categorical limits on the First
Amendment’s scope. Anyone skeptical of the Chaplinsky “slight
social value” justification for categorical exclusions will applaud the
Court’s refusal to ride that justification further. Anyone disturbed
by the susceptibility of certain kinds of speech to the government’s
punitive whims will cheer the Court’s decision not to write violent
images out of the First Amendment. Of course the material at issue
in Stevens, and much of the material in Entertainment Merchants,
would make most people recoil in horror. This is nasty speech. We
deplore the speech, however, because it depicts or represents nasty
conduct. Distinguishing speech from conduct forms the conceptually
infirm but practically essential foundation of First Amendment
law.89 In addition, as both Stevens and Entertainment Merchants
emphasized, our system protects speech against regulations that
target particular ideas.90 The power to regulate conduct lets the
political majority restrict behavior it does not like. The First
Amendment counters that power by creating a space in which
people can at least argue for all sorts of unpopular behavior. In this
86. Id. at 2748-51.
87. Id. at 2749.
88. See id. at 2748-49. Justice Breyer shared many of Justice Alito’s concerns, but he saw
no vagueness in the California law, leading him to dissent rather than concur in the judg-
ment. See id. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD
THING, TOO 105 (1994).
90. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (majority opinion); United States v. Stevens,
130 S. Ct. 1584 (2010).
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case, the Roberts Court deserves credit for not conflating violence
with speech that describes or even advocates violence.91
Beyond shielding the First Amendment from renewed categorical
threats, Stevens and Entertainment Merchants warrant praise for
their broad views about the First Amendment’s protection. The
importance of political speech should not diminish protection for
other kinds of speech, even speech as arguably frivolous as hunting
videos and violent video games. Justice Scalia may have stated the
point too dramatically when he declared in Entertainment Mer-
chants that “it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment,
and dangerous to try,”92 but he was surely right to reject any such
distinction as a First Amendment wedge. Even Alexander Meikle-
john, our most eloquent advocate for the constitutional centrality of
political speech, acknowledged that we need art, literature, and
other nonpolitical inputs to make democracy work.93
In addition, Entertainment Merchants deserves credit for valida-
ting children’s First Amendment rights, especially in the face of
Justice Thomas’s forceful dissenting attack. Perhaps the greatest
free speech case of the past forty years is the Rehnquist Court’s
1995 decision in Reno v. ACLU, which beat back Congress’s ham-
handed effort to purge “indecency” from the Internet.94 That decision
strongly affirmed children’s expressive freedom.95 Despite the
Roberts Court’s dismissive attitude toward children’s free speech
rights at school,96 the Justices wisely followed the lead of Reno as to
video games.97 Entertainment Merchants also tracked Reno by
91. Unfortunately, other Roberts Court decisions have blithely allowed punishment of
speech in order to prevent asserted bad consequences. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (holding that the federal government may punish people who
advise designated terrorist organizations about peaceful conflict resolution); Morse v. Fred-
erick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (holding that a school may punish a student for allegedly
advocating illegal drug use). 
92. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
93. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 117 (1960). 
94. 521 U.S. 884 (1997).
95. See id. at 864-66 (distinguishing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
96. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 403.
97. David Post argues that Entertainment Merchants sets speech protection back by
“resurrect[ing] a version of Ginsberg ... that shields some speech from First Amendment
scrutiny altogether.” David G. Post, Sex, Lies, and Videogames: Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 27, 56. Professor Post slightly
overstates both how far the Ginsberg “harmful to minors” doctrine fell before Entertainment
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resisting California’s plea, and the urging of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito, to suppress new communications technology. The
power of interactive software, Justice Scalia suggested, should in-
trigue rather than frighten us. Entertainment Merchants presents
the Roberts Court’s most expansive thinking about how speech can
create meaning and enable change.
III. THE SPEECH-RESTRICTIVE ROBERTS COURT: ENTRENCHING AND
DEEPENING OLD CATEGORICAL LIMITS
A. The Narrowness of the Speech-Protective Decisions
Unfortunately, closer examination of the free speech victories in
Stevens and Entertainment Merchants reveals narrow rulings un-
likely to make much practical difference in future cases. As state-
ments about the viability of categorical exclusions, these decisions
simply preserve a secure status quo. The categorical approach
stopped expanding decades ago. As I noted above, the Court has not
found a new category of speech to exclude from First Amendment
protection since at least the Ferber child pornography case in 1982,98
and the Court strongly undercut the categorical exclusions of
fighting words and incitement more than four decades ago.99 Even
in the more robust categorical fields of obscenity and defamation, for
the past several decades, the Court has only tinkered around the
edges of the law. In Stevens and Entertainment Merchants, the fed-
eral and California governments forced the categorical issue as to
depictions of violence, and many people would probably sign on to
the core argument that First Amendment law should allow legisla-
tures to treat depictions of violence as harshly as depictions of
sex.100 No legal or political trend, however, even hinted that the
Merchants, and how serious Entertainment Merchants takes that doctrine. Justice Scalia
indulged the notion that the Ginsberg “harmful to minors” rule shields some speech restric-
tions from First Amendment scrutiny, but he then shrugged off the rule’s relevance. See
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2735 (“[Ginsberg] approved a prohibition on the sale to
minors of sexual material.”). Entertainment Merchants, in other words, treated the “harmful
to minors” category much like the modern Court treats the “fighting words” and “incitement”
categories.
98. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
99. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
100. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2734; United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577,
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Court would scrape the rust off its categorical scissors to cut violent
depictions out of First Amendment protection. As Chevy Chase
might say, the categorical approach is still dead.101
The precise holdings in Stevens and Entertainment Merchants
confirm the decisions’ limited impact. The “crush videos” that
Congress wanted to suppress in Stevens represent, to put the point
mildly, a niche market, and the Court left open the possibility that
a narrower ban on those videos might be constitutional.102 Enter-
tainment Merchants reaches farther, because many people play
violent video games and many other people would love to ban them.
Money talks, however, and the size of the video game industry
blunts any significance of Entertainment Merchants for the kinds of
unpopular speakers who most commonly face censorship. Indeed,
both Stevens and Entertainment Merchants protect commercial
products, with neither the speakers nor the Court very concerned
about what ideas the products convey. We will see shortly that the
Court’s treatment of speech as an economic commodity becomes
more pronounced and troubling.103
The Court’s emphasis on tradition in Stevens and Entertainment
Merchants presents still a more serious problem. In both decisions,
the Court justified its refusal to categorically exclude violent images
from First Amendment protection by asserting that only tradition
can support a categorical exclusion, and that no tradition of allowing
the government to regulate violent images existed.104 That approach
will probably anchor free speech law more predictably than the bal-
ancing approach the government advocated in Stevens.105 However,
the approach carries hazards of its own.
Most obviously, a notion that seems ripe for manipulation is that
some speech categories might “have been historically unprotected,
but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in
our case law.”106 Clever judges can manipulate any legal doctrine,
1585-86 (2010).
101. See Saturday Night Live (NBC television broadcast Dec. 13, 1975), transcript available
at http://perma.cc/H2P6-ZNHS (“Generalissimo Francisco Franco is still dead.”).
102. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
103. See infra notes 151-76 and accompanying text (discussing Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
873 (2012)).
104. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2731; Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
105. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
106. Id. at 1586.
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but manipulation works a lot better when it is covert. Appealing to
“tradition” as received truth obscures the fact that reasonable peo-
ple disagree both about what traditions exist and about how, and
how much, tradition should matter in legal decisions. Categorical
speech exclusions, like First Amendment law in general, ultimately
depend on substantive values. The most transparent way for the
Court to decide categorical exclusion cases would be for the Justices
to talk openly about which values matter and why. By rejecting that
substantive analysis in favor of a tradition-bound analysis, the
Roberts Court hides the analytic ball.
The tradition approach also presents a problem of institutional
competence. Tradition means history, and judges generally do not
make good historians.107 A historian explores questions about the
past for their own sake. A judge has to decide present disputes, and
that kind of agenda clouds historical inquiry. Some judicial history
is just inept. Justice Scalia’s assertion in Entertainment Merchants
that “efforts to convince Congress to restrict comic books [in the
1950s] failed”108 ignores the fact that those efforts succeeded in
gutting comic books’ content by forcing the industry to embrace
severe self-censorship.109 Other judicial history skews facts toward
a favored outcome. In his Entertainment Merchants concurrence,
Justice Alito clumsily bootstrapped a controversial legal doctrine
onto a biased (if vague) story about social practice, claiming that
state obscenity bans led to conservative sexual norms, which in turn
justified the Court’s exclusion of obscenity from the First Amend-
ment.110 Stevens and Entertainment Merchants ran into further
trouble when they insisted not only that tradition should determine
the First Amendment’s categorical boundaries but that tradition
always has done so.111 Chief Justice Roberts in Stevens tied himself
in knots explaining how tradition caused the Ferber Court to
107. Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and
Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 385 (1998).
108. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2737.
109. See generally DAVID HAJDU, THE TEN-CENT PLAGUE: THE GREAT COMIC-BOOK SCARE
AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA (2008).
110. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2742-51; supra notes 84-88 and accompanying
text.
111. See supra notes 42-59, 73 and accompanying text.
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exclude child pornography from free speech protection,112 when
Ferber really focused on the substantive harm of exploiting children.
At a deeper level, using tradition to measure any constitutional
right, including First Amendment speech protection, threatens to
defeat the whole purpose of constitutional rights. Constitutional
rights are supposed to stop the political majority from imposing on
minorities certain burdens that we as a society deem wrong as a
matter of foundational law. They are supposed to secure our deepest
principles against our political whims, just like Odysseus had
himself bound to the mast to resist the Sirens’ song.113 If the
Supreme Court defines constitutional rights as protecting only what
the political majority traditionally has not chosen or bothered to
restrict, then constitutional rights secure nothing. The Court’s use
of tradition to set categorical exclusions from the First Amendment
carries obvious dangers for expressive freedom. Even if we believed
that historical questions had clear answers, and that the Court
could always find those answers and properly render them as law,
the Court’s reliance on tradition would freeze speech restrictions in
place wherever they had traditionally prevailed.
Consider the persistence of the Miller obscenity doctrine.114 The
exclusion of “obscenity” from First Amendment protection has never
fit with the rest of our free speech law. Obscenity—extremely ex-
plicit sexual imagery—does not cause immediate violence like
incitement and fighting words. It does not make people fear for their
lives or their safety like true threats. It does not destroy reputations
like libel. Whatever flaws mar the justifications for those other
categorical First Amendment exclusions, each at least requires a
linkage between speech and some tangible harm.115 In contrast,
obscenity requires only that speech be “patently offensive” according
to “contemporary community standards.”116 In other words, obsceni-
ty doctrine lets the government punish speech as long as it concerns
sex and offends people. Why sex? Because sex implicates deep moral
112. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
113. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. XII (Barry B. Powell, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2015).
114. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973).
115. I mean only to indict the obscenity doctrine, not to argue that harm should suffice as
a basis for restricting speech. For the leading argument against harm-grounded speech re-
strictions, see C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 979-81
(1997).
116. Miller, 413 U.S. at 36-37.
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sensibilities. To sum up, the First Amendment protects speech
unless that speech offends people’s deep moral sensibilities. Framed
that way, expressive freedom becomes all but worthless.
The obscenity doctrine’s violation of basic free speech norms, a-
long with society’s evolution beyond its Puritan roots, might suggest
that any renewed judicial offensive against the categorical approach
to First Amendment law would make the obscenity exclusion an
early, welcome casualty. Indeed, a landmark Rehnquist Court
decision questioned whether the government may even regulate
conduct for purely moral reasons.117 The Roberts Court, however,
has actually strengthened the exclusion of obscenity from the First
Amendment. Both Stevens and Entertainment Merchants favorably
contrasted the obscenity doctrine with government arguments for
excluding depictions of violence.118 The Stevens Court’s suggestion
that a narrower ban on crush videos might pass First Amendment
review also nodded toward obscenity, given that crush videos exist
to feed a sexual fetish.119 This Court’s fixation on tradition explains
its enthusiasm for the obscenity doctrine. How can we tolerate
categorical nonprotection of extreme sexually explicit speech, even
as we soundly reject categorical nonprotection of extreme violent
speech? Because we have always been tougher on sex than on
violence. Past performance dictates future results.
B. Using Tradition to Justify Categorical Exclusions
The Roberts Court’s use of tradition to limit expressive freedom
transcends its enthusiastic embrace of the obscenity doctrine. In
three very different cases, the Court has broadened important
categorical exclusions or solidified limits on the First Amendment’s
coverage. Each decision relied in some way on the Court’s assertion
that the speech at issue has traditionally been subject to regulation.
117. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“[T]he fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
118. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2731 (2011); United States v. Stevens,
130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
119. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1592.
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These cases reveal the speech-restrictive underbelly of Stevens and
Entertainment Merchants.
United States v. Williams, a case that predated Stevens and
Entertainment Merchants, made questionable law about the least
controversial category of unprotected speech: child pornography.120
I have explained that the Court’s exclusion of child pornography
from First Amendment protection, announced decades ago in New
York v. Ferber, focused on the act of exploiting children to produce
speech, not on an obscenity-style justification for punishing the
speech itself.121 I have also argued that Ferber did not fit the Roberts
Court’s assertion in Stevens and Entertainment Merchants that
tradition must and does explain all categorical First Amendment
exclusions.122 Williams, although it did not talk explicitly about
“tradition,” leveraged the child pornography exclusion’s now well-
settled state to expand that exclusion.
Williams followed up a speech-protective Rehnquist Court child
pornography case, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.123 The Court in
Free Speech Coalition struck down a law that criminalized the pos-
session or sale of simulated child pornography (images created on
a computer to look like depictions of actual children having sex) and
of material that had been pandered as, but was not in fact, child
pornography.124 Those materials, Free Speech Coalition explained,
do not actually exploit children, and they therefore fell outside the
Ferber justification for withholding First Amendment protection.125
Congress wanted to cast a wide criminal net, to catch as many peo-
ple as possible who actually exploit children,126 but the First Amend-
ment bars the government from criminalizing protected speech—ev-
en sleazy, awful protected speech—to get at unprotected speech.127
Williams considered a new law designed to get back some of what
Free Speech Coalition took away.128 In essence, the new law made it
a federal crime for me to offer you “child pornography,” even when
120. 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
121. 458 U.S. 747 (1982); see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 43-48, 112 and accompanying text.
123. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
124. See id. at 242-43.
125. Id. at 250-51, 254.
126. See id. at 241-42.
127. Id. at 255-56.
128. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 289 (2008).
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the material I have is not really child pornography, or even if I have
no material in hand at all, as long as my offer “reflects the belief, or
... [ ] is intended to cause [you] to believe,” that the material really
is child pornography.129 How can the First Amendment let the
government punish a person who has no material that the First
Amendment lets the government restrict? The answer, according to
Williams, is that the panderer in this scenario offers to provide
material the First Amendment lets the government restrict.130 The
fact that the person making the offer has no unprotected material
makes no difference.
Justice Scalia spent a lot of time in his majority opinion hashing
out what the words of the statute mean,131 and Justice Stevens’s
concurring opinion added a detailed analysis of the legislative
history behind the law.132 In short, Justices Scalia and Stevens
(strange bedfellows, by the way) wanted to prove that this new law
would punish different conduct than the law struck down in Free
Speech Coalition. Justice Souter demurred, arguing in dissent that
Williams undermined Free Speech Coalition by letting Congress
punish speech that the Court had granted First Amendment
protection in the earlier case.133 Justice Scalia, however, distin-
guished the simulated child pornography of Free Speech Coalition
from “the collateral speech that introduces such material into the
child-pornography distribution network.”134 All nine Justices agreed
that the government may properly punish someone for offering to
provide child pornography when he, in fact, possesses nothing.135
Out of respect for Free Speech Coalition, Justice Souter (joined by
Justice Ginsburg) argued that the government should not be able to
punish someone for offering to provide child pornography when he,
in fact, possesses something that is not child pornography.136
Justice Scalia’s opinion actually made a second categorical claim
that reinforced nonprotection of another speech category. “Offers to
129. Id. at 289-90 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2012)).
130. Id. at 298.
131. See id. at 293-97.
132. See id. at 307 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. See id. at 310-27 (Souter, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 293 (majority opinion). Williams also rejected an argument that the pandering
law was unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 306.
135. Id. at 285.
136. Id. at 311 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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engage in illegal transactions,” he declared, “are categorically ex-
cluded from First Amendment protection.”137 Justice Scalia framed
that statement as a simple recitation of existing law, and no other
Justice contradicted him. But no previous decision has identified
“offers to engage in illegal transactions” as an unprotected category
of speech. Certainly the government frequently punishes criminal
offers without First Amendment scruples. Fred Schauer identifies
criminal solicitation as a category of speech that the First Amend-
ment does not cover.138 In Professor Schauer’s view, an array of
political, cultural, historical, and other forces causes courts not even
to think about some speech as raising First Amendment concerns.139
Besides criminal solicitation, other such uncovered speech catego-
ries include violations of antitrust laws, securities regulations, and
evidentiary rules.140 A lack of First Amendment coverage works very
differently from a categorical exclusion. As we have seen, categorical
exclusions require the Court to chart the excluded category and to
give legislatures firm guidance about which speech does and does
not fit within the category. In contrast, legislatures decide what to
do about uncovered speech with little, if any, judicial oversight.
Indeed, noncoverage often occurs in policy areas where legislatures
or administrative agencies have set up strong regulatory systems
that the public has accepted.141 In Williams, Justice Scalia stealthily
transformed criminal solicitation from a noncovered category into
a new categorical exclusion.
Justice Scalia cited two past Supreme Court decisions as having
called offers of illegal transactions categorically unprotected.142 As
137. Id. at 297 (majority opinion). In defending the pandering law’s application to
knowingly false offers to provide child pornography, Justice Scalia actually mentioned yet a
third unprotected category: fraudulent commercial speech. See id. at 299.
138. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1770-71 (2004).
139. See id. at 1787-800.
140. See id. at 1777-84. Professor Schauer describes copyright law, at least prior to the
Rehnquist Court’s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), as falling into the
“uncovered” category as well. See Schauer, supra note 138, at 1783. I discuss Golan v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), the Roberts Court’s successor decision to Eldred later in this Article.
See infra notes 151-76 and accompanying text.
141. See Schauer, supra note 138, at 1805-07.
142. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 297 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949)).
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to the first, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., he was just
wrong.143 In that case, the Court said only that “it has rarely been
suggested” that the First Amendment protects “speech or writing
used as an integral part of ” a crime.144 An offer to engage in an il-
legal transaction is not the same thing as speech used in committing
a crime, and “rarely suggesting” is not rejecting.145 Justice Scalia’s
second precedent, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations, came closer to supporting his claim.146 The Court
in that case said, “We have no doubt that a newspaper constitution-
ally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of
narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.”147 That single sentence, however,
makes no categorical judgment about all speech that proposes illegal
transactions. It does not discuss the relative danger or value of
various proposals to break the law. In Williams, Justice Scalia
simply tossed off a claim about the “unprotected category” of illegal
proposals because that claim helped him expand on the unprotected
category of child pornography.
Justice Scalia’s conversion of criminal solicitation from a gener-
ally uncovered category to a categorical exclusion raises troubling
questions. For example, may the government punish someone who
offers to donate (or sell) her time to organize a political protest, like
a sit-in that involves trespassing? I hope not, but Justice Scalia
suggested no political exception to the new categorical exclusion for
criminal proposals. As a matter of doctrine, what has happened to
Brandenburg v. Ohio?148 That case sharply limited the government’s
power to punish speech that urges illegal action.149 The First
Amendment protects a person unless, and until, she incites others
to commit an immediate lawless act that she knows or expects will
occur.150 Categorically excluding mere proposals of unlawful trans-
143. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
144. Id. at 498.
145. Justice Kennedy may have been trying either to clean up this mistake or to tweak
Justice Scalia when, in a subsequent case, he listed “speech integral to criminal conduct”
among the categorical exclusions from First Amendment protection. United States v. Alvarez,
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion) (citing Giboney, 336 U.S. 490).
146. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
147. Id. at 388.
148. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
149. See id. at 447-48.
150. See id.
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actions seems to throw wide open a door Brandenburg had closed.
The Court’s long practice of letting legislatures identify and punish
egregious sorts of criminal proposals neutralized these hard line-
drawing questions. Turning that passive noncoverage into an active
categorical exclusion makes those line-drawing questions very
important.
The Williams Court stacked up unprotected speech categories to
justify punishing speech that does not fit any of them. The speech
at the heart of the case is not obscenity. It is not child pornography,
although it refers to child pornography that does not really exist.
Some of the speech is fraudulent, and the First Amendment
generally permits punishment of fraud; but some of it is not. The
speech proposes an “illegal transaction,” but the material the
speakers propose to hand over is not really illegal. The result in
Williams did not follow from Ferber. Rather, Williams only makes
sense under a tradition analysis. Even though the decision did not
talk specifically about tradition, it showed how a focus on estab-
lished practices can weaken speech protection. If we have previously
denied First Amendment protection to a category of speech (or
three), says Williams, then that history can justify continuing to ban
that speech reflexively, or even expanding the scope of the ban.
The Roberts Court’s other two speech-restrictive categorical deci-
sions follow the Williams form of thickening what had been
uncovered speech into more formally excluded categories. Probably
the most broadly important of all the Roberts Court’s categorical
speech decisions, Golan v. Holder, involved a First Amendment
challenge to a federal copyright statute.151 Copyright disputes tend
to involve conflicts between two different sorts of free speech
interests. The Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution lets
Congress protect intellectual property “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.”152 Copyright promotes authorship by en-
suring authors’ ability to profit from their works. A failure by the
government to protect copyright does not violate the First Amend-
ment, but the Court has held in other contexts that the government
does violate the First Amendment when it affirmatively interferes
151. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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with an author’s ability to profit from her work.153 Thus, copyright
laws protect a sort of interest that the First Amendment also
protects. On the other side of the ledger, unauthorized uses of copy-
righted material always involve speech. Therefore, at least as a first
cut, copyright violations fall within the First Amendment’s protec-
tive scope. The presence of serious speech interests on each side of
a dispute would seem to compel the Court to perform a nuanced
analysis that compares and balances the competing interests.
The Court, however, has resolved First Amendment copyright
claims categorically in favor of copyright holders. Golan upheld a
federal statute that writes an international copyright agreement
into U.S. law.154 The agreement grants copyright protection to
certain foreign works that had passed into the public domain,
meaning that their copyrights had expired and anyone could use or
publish them.155 The statute restores their copyright protection.156
Artists and publishers who had been freely using the works
challenged the statute, claiming that its new constraint on their
uses violated the First Amendment.157 Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion closely followed the reasoning of another opinion she wrote
a decade earlier: Eldred v. Ashcroft.158 Eldred rejected a First
Amendment challenge to a law that extended the durations of
existing copyrights, holding that the First Amendment does not
generally apply to copyright disputes.159 Golan reiterated and
intensified that holding. Justice Ginsburg completely rejected the
idea that copyright raises any First Amendment problems.160 She
153. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105 (1991) (striking down a state law that garnished profits from convicted criminals’ writings
to compensate their victims).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, adopted Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY. DOC. NO. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended
Sept. 28, 1979).
155. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 874-75.
156. See id. at 890.
157. See id. at 878. The Golan challengers also argued that Congress lacked the power to
enact the statute in the first place. The Court rejected that claim. Id. at 884-89. Justice
Breyer’s dissent disputed this holding in light of the First Amendment interests at stake, but
did not reach the distinct First Amendment issue. See id. at 900, 907-08 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
158. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
159. Id. Note that a copyright may still violate the First Amendment if it offends some
distinct free speech principle, like discriminating based on an author’s viewpoint.
160. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889-90 (majority opinion).
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reasoned that two long-standing rules of copyright law assuage any
free speech concerns. The first rule says authors may not copyright
“ideas,” but only “expressions,” and the second says making “fair
use” of a protected work for purposes such as criticism, scholarship,
and news reporting does not violate copyright.161
Golan, like Eldred before it, shrugged off one of the most impor-
tant free speech concerns for our information-driven society. The
Internet’s rapid growth has multiplied the amount of information
that people can access. Increased access encourages people to use
information in new and creative ways. In music, for example, hip-
hop producers sample old funk, rock, and soul records to create new
sounds; bedroom DJs layer seemingly incongruous songs into inge-
nious mash ups; and aspiring pop stars court attention by posting
fresh covers of familiar songs to YouTube. We may have good rea-
sons to place some copyright limits on such practices. Even so,
should not the First Amendment, our defense against excessive
speech restrictions, have something to say about whether and when
copyright law applies too broadly and suppresses or chills too much
speech?
Golan echoed Eldred in saying no.162 Justice Ginsburg embraced
a particular economic theory about copyright: any amount of
copyright protection, no matter how long it lasts, serves the
uniquely valuable purpose of giving authors incentives to create.163
That theory has obvious flaws. Even if we accept the questionable
premise that authors would not create works absent copyright
protection, time-limited protection should suffice to make creation
worthwhile, and the protection could incorporate some limits
without destroying the incentive to create. On the other side of the
conflict, Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the possibility that
enabling derivative uses may add more to public discourse than it
costs. Since Justice Stevens’s retirement, Justice Ginsburg may be
the Court’s most reliable “liberal,” but her liberalism here took on
a classical, rather than contemporary, cast. She characterized the
creative process as an arid economic realm in which the market’s
authority maintains an economically desirable status quo.164
161. See id. at 890.
162. See id. at 889-91.
163. See id. at 888-89.
164. Id.
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Golan went even farther than Eldred in its disregard for the First
Amendment in one important way: its use of a story about tradition
to limit speech protection. Eldred stated that “[w]hen ... Congress
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection,
further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”165 That state-
ment implied that the First Amendment bars Congress from
changing the “traditional contours” to the extent they protect
speech. Golan, however, did not repeat, let alone fulfill, that
implication. The law upheld in Golan revived copyright protection
for works whose copyrights had expired. That tops the law upheld
in Eldred, which extended the lengths of copyrights still in effect
when the law was enacted. The newer law certainly looks like an
important change in “traditional contours.” The Golan Court,
though, found this distinction unimportant, treating passage of the
affected works into the public domain as a legal aberration that
“deprived [authors] of protection” during part of “the normal copy-
right term.”166 The mere persistence of other “traditional contours
of copyright protection,” namely the idea-expression dichotomy and
the fair use doctrine, made First Amendment review of copyright
protections unnecessary.167 The Court’s reliance on tradition in
Stevens and Entertainment Merchants led it to reaffirm First
Amendment protection for depictions of violence. In contrast, the
Court’s selective reliance on tradition in Golan led it to reaffirm
First Amendment nonprotection for uses of (re)copyrighted material.
Rather than confronting the conflict between speech interests, ask-
ing whether the idea-expression distinction and the fair use doctrine
protect enough speech, or giving a substantive reason for letting
Congress remove works from the public domain, Golan simply in-
voked tradition to give Congress a pass.
Neil Netanel, one of our deepest thinkers about copyright law,
believes Golan and Eldred have decent potential to protect speech
interests.168 Professor Netanel calls the Court’s approach to
copyright a form of “definitional balancing.”169 The Court, he argues,
165. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (citations omitted).
166. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 893.
167. Id. at 890 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. See Neil W. Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v.
Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1086-87 (2013).
169. Id. at 1086. Professor Netanel draws the concept from Melville B. Nimmer, Does
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weighed the speech interests that cut against copyright and the
nonspeech interests he thinks cut in its favor. He portays the idea-
expression distinction and the fair use doctrine as the tools the
Court used to settle the conflict.170 Professor Netanel does not think
courts have applied these doctrines with enough rigor,171 but he be-
lieves the doctrines, properly applied, can do the necessary speech-
protective work in copyright law. He points out that the Court has
used definitional balancing to shape other categories of unprotected
speech.172 For example, the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
performed definitional balancing by carving out some but not all
defamatory speech as unprotected libel.173
I agree with Professor Netanel that definitional balancing has
value for addressing conflicts in both defamation and copyright
disputes. The trouble is that the Court takes a much harder line in
copyright disputes than in defamation disputes. Although the First
Amendment does not shield speakers from liability for defaming an
ordinary private citizen, it does prohibit states from imposing liabil-
ity without fault, and it heightens the showing a private plaintiff
must make to recover punitive damages.174 Copyright works very
differently because Eldred, and especially Golan, have written the
First Amendment entirely out of the script. The idea-expression dis-
tinction and the fair use doctrine, which Professor Netanel portrays
as the vehicles for definitional balancing in copyright, are not First
Amendment mandates. They are just limits Congress has chosen to
place on copyright. Professor Netanel understands the difference,
and he argues forcefully that the Court should invoke the First
Amendment if Congress, for example, tries to weaken the fair use
doctrine.175 As we have seen, however, the Eldred Court’s implied
promise to defend “the traditional contours of copyright protection”
came to nothing in Golan.176
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L.
REV. 1180 (1970).
170. See Netanel, supra note 168, at 1095-103 (discussing Eldred and Golan).
171. See id. at 1103-13 (critiquing the idea-expression distinction and the fair use doctrine
in practice).
172. See id. at 1088.
173. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Netanel, supra note 168, at 1088.
174. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347, 349 (1974).
175. See Netanel, supra note 168, at 1113-27.
176. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003).
1368 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1339
The final case in the Roberts Court’s restrictive categorical trilogy
once again relied on a tradition-bound analysis, but it also tran-
scended tradition in ways that anticipated the Roberts Court’s de-
cisions about the First Amendment in the political process. Nevada
Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan unanimously upheld a Nevada
law that bars a “public officer” from voting on, or advocating about,
any matter as to which the official has a conflict of interest.177
Michael Carrigan, a city council member, challenged the law.178 He
argued that his legislative votes expressed his viewpoints and that
the First Amendment should bar the government from forcing him
to forego this form of expression.179 Justice Scalia once again wrote
for the Court. As a “preliminary detail,” he brushed aside concerns
about the Nevada law’s restriction on advocacy.180 Justice Scalia
surmised that the restriction meant “advocating [a matter’s] pas-
sage or failure during the legislative debate.”181 Assuming the
restriction on voting passed muster, he explained, the restriction on
advocacy by officials barred from voting served to prevent legislative
sessions from becoming “massive town-hall meetings.”182
Justice Scalia then focused on the Nevada law’s voting restriction.
Although he did not explicitly find public officials’ votes to be an
excluded speech category, he effectively treated them that way. Two
distinct lines of reasoning led him to that result. First, in the man-
ner of (though without citing) Stevens, Justice Scalia emphasized
that a long national tradition supported the constitutionality of re-
cusal requirements for conflicts of interest.183 Surveying federal and
state legal history as to both judges and legislators, he found not one
case that struck down an even-handed recusal rule.184 Second,
Justice Scalia argued that legislative votes are not expressive, and
therefore not protected speech.185 A legislator’s vote, he reasoned, is
not the legislator’s expression at all. Rather, “a legislator’s vote is
the commitment of his apportioned share of the legislature’s power
177. 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011) (upholding NEV. REV. STAT. § 281A.420 (2007)).
178. See id. at 2343.
179. See id. at 2347.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 2348.
184. See id. at 2347-50.
185. Id.
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to the passage or defeat of a particular proposal.”186 The legislator
had no right to his vote, and without a rights-bearing speaker, the
First Amendment had nothing to protect. Only Justice Alito’s
partial concurrence challenged Justice Scalia’s argument that legis-
lative votes are not expressive. Justice Alito pointed out that
legislative votes convey information, and therefore must be pro-
tected speech.187 In the end, however, he agreed with the tradition-
based argument for allowing the recusal rule to restrict speech.188
I take no issue with the main holding in Carrigan: that the First
Amendment should not bar recusal rules for public officials.
Moreover, Carrigan improved in one important respect on the other
categorical First Amendment decisions discussed above. Justice
Scalia did not begin and end his analysis with talk of tradition.
Instead, he provided a specific, substantial reason, entirely distinct
from tradition, for excluding legislative votes from First Amendment
protection: legislative votes are not expressive.189 If the Court wants
to place categories of speech outside the First Amendment’s bound-
aries, this sort of reasoning seems essential. Unfortunately, the
particulars of Justice Scalia’s substantive argument raise serious
concerns.
First of all, Justice Scalia skated too quickly past the Nevada
law’s restriction on “advocacy.” This paladin of precise textualism190
breezily presumed that “advocacy” referred only to legislative
debates. Even if that premise is right, strong First Amendment and
legislative process interests support letting legislators debate even
about bills on which they cannot vote. Legislators’ arguments in-
form both the public and their colleagues as surely as arguments by
nonconflicted legislators do. But the premise is probably wrong. The
Nevada law applies to all “public officers,” not just to legislators.191
Nonlegislators do not ordinarily “advocate” in legislative sessions.
186. Id. at 2350. The Roberts Court’s opinion and Justice Thomas’s concurrence in
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008), echoed
the idea that electoral ballots are not expressive.
187. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2354 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
188. See id. at 2354-55.
189. See id. at 2351 (majority opinion).
190. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 15-28 (2012).
191. NEV. REV. STAT. § 281A.420 (2007).
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The meaning of “advocacy” in the Nevada law thus must extend well
beyond legislative debates, creating First Amendment problems that
Justice Scalia blithely ignored.
The major problem with Justice Scalia’s argument that legislative
votes are not expressive is that the argument sweeps in more than
just legislative votes. Justice Scalia tied Carrigan to two Rehnquist
Court cases that rejected First Amendment challenges to a restric-
tion on whom a political party could nominate for office192 and a ban
on write-in votes.193 Taken together, these three decisions roughly
define “speech in the course of executing governmental or electoral
functions” as categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.
That is a big idea, one that Carrigan does not come close to defend-
ing thoroughly.194 Nonprotection of governmental and electoral
speech resonates with the Roberts Court’s deference to speech regu-
lations when the government acts as institutional manager195 or
property owner.196 Justice Alito, however, is right to argue that
legislative votes have expressive content. Parties’ candidate nomin-
ations and voters’ write-in ballots also have expressive content. The
Carrigan Court should have reached its result by balancing the
legislator’s speech interest against the public’s interest in corrup-
tion-free government. Such a balancing analysis would not change
the result in Carrigan, although it would, and should, have doomed
the candidate nomination restriction and the write-in ban from the
earlier cases. Unfortunately, the Roberts Court hesitated no more
in Carrigan than in Williams or Golan to let categorical analysis
clear a path to restricting speech.
A final, major problem with Carrigan is that it dove recklessly
into contentious debates about politics. When Justice Scalia posited
192. See Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2351 (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520
U.S. 351 (1997)).
193. See id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)).
194. For one thing, that categorical exclusion seems to conflict with the Roberts Court’s
somewhat tentative holding in Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010), that signing a petition for
a ballot measure is protected speech. Justices Scalia and Alito clash over the depth of that
conflict. Compare Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2351, with Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2354-55 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
195. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (rejecting a city prosecutor’s challenge
to an adverse employment action based on his internal criticism of a prosecution).
196. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (rejecting a religious group’s
challenge to a city’s refusal to display a monument the group donated alongside similar
monuments in a public park).
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that only constituents, not legislators, have rights in legislators’
votes, he implicitly favored a particular theory of representative
government under which legislators act as agents for their constitu-
ents rather than exercising independent judgment.197 A similar
difficulty animated Justice Kennedy’s strange, intriguing concurring
opinion. Justice Kennedy agreed with the Court, but said he might
have thought differently if the case had raised a different First
Amendment concern—that conflict-of-interest recusal rules discour-
age the kinds of associations and relationships that might cause
conflicts of interest.198 Justice Kennedy’s opinion is strange because
the case does present the concern he identified. Carrigan argued
that the recusal rule violated his First Amendment interests, and
those interests included associations foregone or compromised due
to the rule. The opinion is intriguing because it suggests that
Justice Kennedy distrusts broad legal barriers against political
corruption. That same distrust plays a huge role in his pivotal oppo-
sition to campaign finance regulations.199 The Carrigan Court’s
failure to engage Justice Kennedy’s concern, or more generally to
connect its reasoning with the related problems that arise in the
campaign finance cases, almost certainly reflects strategic compro-
mise, because the nearly unanimous Carrigan majority has split
bitterly over campaign finance.200 That failure, however, reinforces
the sense that Carrigan depended on unstated political premises the
Court has not thought through.
The Roberts Court’s fixation on tradition in Stevens and Enter-
tainment Merchants raises warning flags about the depth of the
Court’s speech-protective commitments. Williams, Golan, and Carri-
gan set those flags fluttering. Even when this Court rightly rejects
a First Amendment claim, as it did in Carrigan, its tradition-bound
analysis corrodes expressive freedom by letting the Court entrench
197. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1861) (discussing theories of representation). Deborah Hellman includes Carrigan among a
group of Supreme Court decisions that she criticizes for preferring particular theories of de-
mocracy. See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1389-90 (2013).
198. See Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2352 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
199. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908-11 (2010) (rejecting an anticorruption
rationale for a federal ban on independent corporate and union expenditures in election cam-
paigns).
200. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
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speech-restrictive legal doctrines. Taken together, the two speech-
protective and three speech-restrictive categorical majority decisions
depict a Court with dubious free speech commitments. The Roberts
Court uses its account of legal traditions to protect a bit of speech,
reinforce and broaden some important categorical exclusions, and
above all keep a more assertive hand on the categorical First
Amendment rudder than we have seen in almost half a century.
IV. ONCE MORE INTO THE BREACH?
The Roberts Court’s most recent categorical First Amendment
decision revived some of the promise of Stevens and Entertainment
Merchants. It also reinforced the concerns the speech-restrictive
cases raise about the Roberts Court’s tradition-bound approach to
categorical First Amendment exclusions.
The Court in United States v. Alvarez struck down a federal law
called the Stolen Valor Act.201 Congress passed the law to punish
people who claim to have won high military honors they never
actually won.202 More people do this than you probably think, for
reasons that range from calculating to compulsive. Quite a few peo-
ple, like the defendant in this case, Xavier Alvarez, even lie about
having received the Congressional Medal of Honor.203 These lies
naturally offend real recipients of high military honors and their
comrades and loved ones.204 The Stolen Valor Act reveals the tip of
a very interesting legal iceberg: Should the First Amendment pro-
tect outright lies? The value of lying for the pursuit of truth, dem-
ocratic self-government, or individual fulfillment through speech is
hard to pin down. “Lying,” however, is an enormous category that
sweeps in a lot of different speech. At least some lies, like telling
survivors of a burn victim that their loved one died without pain, or
leaking the wrong information about troop movements, serve good
purposes. Thinking categorically about First Amendment protection
for lies turns out to be tricky. The Alvarez opinions reflect that
difficulty.
201. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).
202. See id. at 2539.
203. See id. at 2558 (Alito, J., dissenting).
204. See id. at 2549 (plurality opinion).
2015] ROBERTS COURT AND FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH 1373
The government wanted the Court in Alvarez to exclude lies from
the First Amendment to the greatest extent possible, extending only
enough protection to ensure that laws against lying do not chill
truthful speech.205 The government pointed out that many federal
and state laws punish various sorts of lies, including perjury,
commercial fraud, and impersonating a government official.206 But
Justice Kennedy, writing for the four-Justice plurality, portrayed
each of those laws as targeting a “legally cognizable harm associated
with a false statement.”207 The Stolen Valor Act, in contrast, “targets
falsity and nothing more.”208 Reiterating the holding of Stevens that
tradition provides the proper lens for analyzing categorical speech
exclusions,209 Justice Kennedy conceded that “our law and tradition
show ... instances in which the falsity of speech bears upon whether
it is protected.”210 He insisted, however, that those instances did not
support categorically excluding lies from First Amendment protec-
tion. Perhaps realizing that no tradition forecloses categorical
exclusion of lies either, he ended his categorical analysis with dire
warnings about the dangers of “government authority to compile a
list of subjects about which false statements are punishable.”211 To
make sure no one would miss his point, he even cited George
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.212
Justice Kennedy made a sound substantive case that even lies
can benefit public debate, noting that “the outrage and contempt”
lies inspire “can serve to reawaken and reinforce the public’s re-
spect” for valuable ideas or institutions (here, military medals and
their recipients).213 Then he went further and did even better: “Soci-
ety has the right and civic duty to engage in open, dynamic, rational
discourse.”214 In other words, even if we cannot be sure public debate
will put bad speech in its place, the First Amendment compels us to
take a leap of faith. With the categorical argument out of the way,
205. Id. at 2539.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2545.
209. See id. at 2544 (citing United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010)).
210. Id. at 2546.
211. Id. at 2547.
212. See id. (citing GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949)).
213. Id. at 2550.
214. Id. 
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Justice Kennedy finished his opinion by ruling that the govern-
ment’s serious interest in protecting the integrity of the military
honors system does not justify restricting false honors claims.215 He
found no real evidence that lies about military honors undermine
public perception of the honors system, and he urged counterspeech
(in the form of an easily accessible registry of military honors recipi-
ents) as a better way of preventing whatever harm the lies might
do.216
Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated the views of only four Justices.
The result in Alvarez depended on the additional votes of Justices
Breyer and Kagan, who concurred only in the Court’s judgment, not
endorsing any of Justice Kennedy’s language. “I do not,” begins
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, “rest my conclusion upon a
strict categorical analysis.”217 Well, of course not. The only way to
decide the case on a strict categorical analysis would be to hold lies
categorically excluded from the First Amendment, thus voting to
strike down the law. What Justice Breyer appears to have meant,
and what his opinion is all about, is that the Court should have used
a more flexible balancing analysis to decide whether the govern-
ment’s interest in protecting the integrity of military honors
justified the Stolen Valor Act.218 Unfortunately, his odd way of
dealing (or not dealing) with the plurality’s categorical exclusion
analysis prevents us from saying with confidence that Alvarez
firmly rejected categorical exclusion of lies from the First Amend-
ment. Having thus muddied the waters, Justice Breyer proceeded
to make a convincing, characteristically pragmatic argument about
why the First Amendment should block at least the Stolen Valor
Act’s attempt to punish lies. He echoed and fleshed out Justice
Kennedy’s argument that this law went further than other, valid
laws that restrict lying, and he then echoed and fleshed out Justice
Kennedy’s argument that counterspeech can adequately address the
concerns behind the law.219
Justice Alito, dissenting for himself and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, would have denied First Amendment protection to “false
215. Id. at 2551.
216. See id. at 2549-51.
217. Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring).
218. See id. at 2551-52.
219. See id. at 2553-56.
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factual statements that inflict real harm and serve no legitimate
interest.”220 That phrase stacked the deck. If we are certain that a
given speech category does great harm and absolutely no good, then
of course the government should be able to ban it. Justice Alito then
proceeded to advance a series of dubious arguments. He suggested
that the government needs the Stolen Valor Act to prevent fraudu-
lent claims for veterans’ benefits,221 although separate fraud laws
already protect against that problem. He justified the Act as check-
ing lies that “debase the distinctive honor of military awards,”222
although a landmark Rehnquist Court decision on flag burning
rejected a very similar sort of interest as illegitimate for punishing
speech.223 Justice Alito justified the Act as helping the military “to
foster morale and esprit de corps,”224 even though the Court has long
since repudiated an infamous early First Amendment decision that
validated a similar interest as more important than free speech.225
He insisted that a registry of military award recipients would not
protect the integrity of the honors system because the Defense
Department has said it cannot create a full registry,226 which must
mean either that the Department is incompetent or that the “false
statements of fact” he wanted to let the government ban could not
actually be proven false. He further objected to a counter-speech
remedy because public discussion of false honor claims might
“increase skepticism among members of the public about the entire
awards system,”227 an argument that insults the public’s judgment
220. Id. at 2557 (Alito, J., dissenting).
221. See id. at 2558-59.
222. Id. at 2559. Justice Breyer also made this argument. Id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring).
223. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410-21 (1989) (rejecting the American flag’s
function of symbolizing national unity as a justification for a legal ban on flag burning).
Christina Wells assails the Stolen Valor Act for resembling the infamous punishment of
“seditious libel,” basically libel against the government, which she explains sought “to
preserve honor and status roles.” Christina E. Wells, Lies, Honor, and the Government’s Good
Name: Seditious Libel and the Stolen Valor Act, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 136, 148 (2012).
224. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting).
225. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding criminal convictions for
distributing leaflets that urged conscripts not to join the military); cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (announcing a rigorous incitement test to replace the permissive “clear
and present danger” test under which the Court had upheld the convictions in Schenck).
226. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2559.
227. Id. at 2560.
1376 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1339
so brazenly that it validates Justice Kennedy’s Nineteen Eighty-Four
reference.
Despite those deep problems, the dissent’s most important feature
is its fairly credible use of tradition to attack the Stolen Valor Act.
Justice Alito posited “a long tradition of [congressional] efforts to
protect our country’s system of military honors,” as well as a long
tradition of judicial holdings that lies have no value worth protect-
ing under the First Amendment.228 His story about tradition carries
at least as much weight as the majority Justices’ efforts to distin-
guish different kinds of lies by the supposedly different sorts of
damage they do. Justice Alito’s effective reliance on tradition put
serious wind behind his attack on the majority’s “radical interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment.”229
What should we make of Alvarez? In an important sense, the case
stands tall alongside Stevens and Entertainment Merchants. The
Court, using a tradition-based analysis, rejected the government’s
call to place a category of speech outside the scope of First Amend-
ment protection. Moreover, the category of lies seems broader and
more legally vulnerable than the category of violent depictions. That
makes Alvarez potentially more important than Stevens or Enter-
tainment Merchants, both of whose practical significance I have
questioned. The key word, though, is “potentially.” Even though six
Justices in Alvarez signed onto arguments that support First
Amendment protection for lies, the lack of a majority opinion makes
Alvarez less valuable as a legal precedent than any of the other de-
cisions discussed in this Article. The case stands as a garbled
beginning to what will have to be a longer conversation.230 Alvarez
also shows us another angle on the problems of the Roberts Court’s
tradition-bound approach to categorical speech decisions. The major-
ity and dissenting opinions dueled, in a way absent from the other
categorical cases, about which result the tradition analysis should
yield. Even if Alvarez had squarely and unanimously used tradition
228. See id. at 2557, 2560-62.
229. Id. at 2563.
230. One First Amendment scholar holds up the fractured opinions of Alvarez as the poster
child for what he sees as the Supreme Court’s chronic failure to develop and stick with firm
principles for free speech law. See Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the
Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States
v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499 (2013).
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to sustain the First Amendment claim, it would just be one more
data point for the tradition analysis’s capacity to protect speech. In-
stead, the dissenting Justices’ ability to tell a forceful story about
why tradition should defeat the First Amendment claim reinforces
doubts that the tradition analysis can effectively protect speech at
all.
CONCLUSION
Why have the Roberts Court years seen an explosion in argu-
ments about categorical speech exclusions? The categorical renais-
sance may simply reflect government lawyers’ strategic choices to
make categorical exclusion arguments. Those choices, in turn, may
reflect heightened concerns about depictions of violence, opportun-
ism grounded in the tantalizing vitality of the obscenity doctrine,
desire to cut through the ever-increasing complexity of First Amend-
ment law, or any number of other factors. On the other hand, the
Court may have wanted to revisit the categorical aspects of First
Amendment law. Although these decisions do not generally break
down along simple liberal-conservative lines, the Justices’ analytic
focus on tradition reflects core conservative values in its reverence
for the past, axiomatic resistance to government regulation, and
allowance for legal restrictions on socially undesirable behavior.
With the notable exception of Golan, conservative Justices wrote all
of the majority and plurality opinions in the categorical cases.
Perhaps the Chief Justice and his colleagues have decided the time
has come to state fresh justifications in this venerable but long-
neglected area of free speech law—justifications both for protecting
some speech and for exposing other speech to regulation.
Stevens, Entertainment Merchants, and Alvarez all uphold speech
protections, and they contain some of the Supreme Court’s most
direct, vigorous rhetoric in recent memory about the value of
expressive freedom. Both the law those cases made and some of the
reasons they gave for making that law deserve applause from civil
libertarians. As I have shown, however, even those cases brought
mixed blessings for First Amendment speech protection, and the
Court’s other, less-heralded categorical speech decisions—Williams,
Golan, and Carrigan—expose their Janus face. I have focused on
these decisions’ emphasis on tradition, which justified speech
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restrictions in the second cluster of decisions and prompted sharp
disagreement in Alvarez. Beyond tradition, the categorical decisions
present other grounds for concern. Commercial speakers with
economic power fared better in these cases than more marginal
speakers. The Court, especially in Golan, seemed to view speech as
little more than an economic commodity. Golan also showed the
Court’s refusal to confront conflicts between different free speech
values. These elements recur elsewhere in the Roberts Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence.
The limits, deficiencies, and outright failures of the Roberts
Court’s categorical speech decisions look especially glaring if we
want First Amendment law to encourage diversity in the range of
people active in public debates and in the range of ideas those
debates generate, with the aim of enabling political and social
change. Stevens and Entertainment Merchants have very limited
value for achieving those goals. Both decisions did the right thing
within their bounds, but decrying a categorical method that the
Court has long disfavored does not move the speech protection need-
le. Both decisions directly benefited commercial entities whose
speech interests, while relevant under an appropriately broad view
of First Amendment rights, do not face any systematic threat or
suppression. Although Entertainment Merchants showed some ap-
preciation of speech as a creative force, neither decision suggested
any path for expanding the range of participants and ideas in public
debate. The Court’s reliance on tradition to chart the First Amend-
ment’s boundaries seems likely to discourage such expansion. Golan
effectively raised the cost of entry for speakers who want to make
novel use of cultural materials, while Williams and Carrigan rein-
forced the Court’s retrograde emphasis on tradition. Alvarez sugges-
ted the Court has some appetite for protecting the interests of
marginal, even despised speakers and for resisting calls to exclude
speech categories from First Amendment protection. That decision,
however, is neutered by its lack of a majority opinion.
I am not a free speech absolutist. I do not believe the Court
should extend First Amendment coverage to, for example, errone-
ous bond ratings or unprotected sex.231 I think many uncovered
231. See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56
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categories of speech should remain uncovered, and I think some of
the Court’s long-standing, qualified categorical exclusions (incite-
ment, defamation, true threats) largely make sense. In general,
though, I would rather balance vulnerable speech against the
government’s regulatory interest than bury it under a categorical
exclusion.
Analysis of the Roberts Court’s categorical First Amendment
decisions makes a fair beginning to a comprehensive study and
critique of this Court’s free-speech jurisprudence. The Justices
deserve to have their best face put forward, and the categorical
decisions offer the most familiar evidence for characterizing this
Court as a beacon of expressive freedom. As this Article has shown,
however, thorough examination of the Roberts Court’s categorical
speech decisions reveals at best an ambivalent Court, following a
self-charted path of tradition to a troubling mixture of free speech
victories and losses. If these decisions present the Roberts Court at
its speech-protective best, free speech advocates should not hold out
much hope that the whole of the Court’s First Amendment jurispru-
dence will make them happy.
       
